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597 
PROHIBITION OF INDOCTRINATION IN EDUCATION –             
A LOOK AT THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights law recognizes certain rights for parents 
relating to the education of their children. The law also recognizes the 
right for private parties to establish educational institutions independent 
from those operated by the state as well as the right to “academic free-
dom” for educators. These parental and educator rights can sometimes 
conflict with the rights international law recognizes for children, such as 
their right to education and their right to freedom of thought.  Out of the 
various international human rights law enforcement and monitoring bod-
ies, the European Court of Human Rights is the court that most often 
finds itself in the position of balancing these different rights against each 
other. 
Throughout its case law, the European Court of Human Rights seems 
to have adopted “prohibition of indoctrination” as the guiding principle 
to manage these conflicting rights. As introduced in Part I, this article 
considers how the principle of prohibition of indoctrination has devel-
oped through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and 
replaced the traditional understanding of parental rights. Part II examines 
the educational rights of parents, educators, and children and briefly ex-
plains how these rights can conflict. Part III illustrates the development 
of the principle of indoctrination through the European Court of Human 
Rights and the justifications for adopting the principle over a more tradi-
tional understanding of parental rights. Part IV discusses and analyzes 
the meaning, scope, and implications of the prohibition of indoctrination 
as it applies to public schools. Part V questions the different implications 
of the prohibition of indoctrination for private schools and homeschool-
ing. Part VI concludes. 
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II.  INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND EDUCATORS 
IN RELATION TO EDUCATION. 
A. The Rights of Parents 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires—
as a component of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, or reli-
gion—state parties to “have respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions.”1 The Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights establishes—as 
part of the right to education—the following: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose 
for their children schools, other than those established by the public au-
thorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as 
may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.2 
In the Inter-American Human Rights Protection System, the American 
Convention on Human Rights establishes—under freedom of conscience 
and religion—that, “Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the 
right to provide for the religious and moral education of their children or 
wards that is in accord with their own conviction.”3 The San Salvador 
Protocol—the Inter-American Human Rights Protection System instru-
ment on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—establishes that, in con-
formity with domestic legislation and international education principles, 
“parents should have the right to select the type of education to be given 
to their children.”4 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms is the main instrument of the European Human Rights Protection 
System. This convention, unlike the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, does 
not make any explicit reference to the parental right to dictate the reli-
 
 1  International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 2  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 13(3), Jan. 3, 1976, 
993 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].  
 3  American Convention on Human Rights, art. 12(4), Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S 171 
[hereinafter ACHR]. 
 4  Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), Nov. 17, 1988, art. 13(4), 69 
O.A.S.T.S. [hereinafter SSP].  
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gious or moral education of their children within its primary text. How-
ever, in its first protocol, the article establishing the right to education 
states, “In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own reli-
gious and philosophical convictions.”5 
The right to education is normally considered an economic, social, 
and cultural right. Whether one of these rights is or ought to be enforcea-
ble is a matter of constant debate.6  The main argument against enforcea-
bility is the limited resources available to states.7 Being dependent on re-
sources, the argument goes, economic, social, and cultural rights cannot 
be enforced in the same way as civil and political rights.8 
The preceding argument presents a simplified view of the issue: Not 
all rights classified as economic, social, and cultural necessarily depend 
on resources for their satisfaction. Further, some civil and political rights 
are resource-dependent.9 It falls outside the scope of this article to at-
tempt to sort the complex and highly debated issues of an economic, so-
cial and cultural right’s enforceability. However, it should be noted that 
the aspects of the right to education, which concern parental rights, do 
not necessarily involve resource investment for their fulfillment. In that 
way, parental education rights are more similar to the freedom of expres-
sion or freedom of association than to the right to adequate housing. 
Though the right to education is considered an economic, social, and 
cultural right, it is recognized in a protocol to the European Convention 
of Human Rights, a treaty concerning civil and political rights, and en-
forced by the European Court of Human Rights, an enforcement body for 
civil and political rights.10 The right to have the state respect both one’s 
 
 5  Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter ECHR P1].  
 6  See Mónica Tinta, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-
American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, 29(2) 
HUM. RTS. Q. 431, 431–33 (2007). 
 7  Id.  
 8  See Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Na-
ture of State Parties’ Obligations, art. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter 
UNCESCR, No. 3].  
 9  For example, political rights require states to invest resources in establishing elections 
while the right to form trade unions (considered an Economic, Social, and Cultural Right) only re-
quires states to abstain from unduly interfering with their establishment.  See Jackbeth Mapulanga-
Hulston, Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6(4) I. J. HUM. RTS 
29, 40–41. 
 10  The San Salvador Protocol establishes the right to education as one of only two Econom-
ic, Social, and Cultural Rights the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is authorized to enforce. 
SSP, supra note 4, at art. 19(6) (the other being the right to form trade unions). Though also author-
ized to deal with issues of parental rights in relation to the education of their children by virtue of the 
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private and family life as recognized in international human rights law 
also provides some powers to parents. Under this right, parents have a 
recognized authority to make decisions relating to the well-being of their 
children,11 and states are required to not interfere unjustifiably in the pri-
vate family relations between parents and their children.12 This private 
family relation includes parents communicating their views and values to 
their children.  However, the specific provisions relating to parental 
rights in education contained in the European Court of Human Rights 
Protocol 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights; San Salvador Protocol; and in the freedom of education articles 
of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Right have a legal content of their own. They 
have implications beyond the right of having the state respect one’s pri-
vate and family life.13 
The special parental rights in relation to the education of their chil-
dren grant parents a protection against the risk that the state education 
system would hinder the parents’ efforts to guide their children toward a 
path which is in accordance with their own moral, religious or philosoph-
ical convictions.14  Historically, the main implication of this right has 
been an obligation for states that implement sectarian religious classes as 
part of their official education curriculum to provide alternatives to stu-
dents whose parents feel such classes are not in conformity with their 
views.15 Possible alternatives include exempting children from such clas-
ses at the parents’ request,16 providing alternative secular or non-
sectarian classes, authorizing private schools to omit such classes from 
their curriculum,17 or permitting parents to homeschool.18 
 
freedom of conscience and religion article of the American Convention on Human Rights, the case 
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this area is very scarce. For that reason, this 
article will focus primarily in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 11  See Glass v. United Kingdom, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 74. 
 12  See Case “Relating to Certain Aspects on the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education 
in Belgium” v. Belgium, 6 ECHR Ser A. 33 ¶ I(B)(7)  (1968) [hereinafter Belgian Linguistic Case]. 
 13  Id. ¶ I(A)(3).  
 14  Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22, ¶ 53 (1976). 
 15  A second implication of this is the right of parents to opt to send their children to private 
schools, independent of any religious or philosophical objections to the content of public education. 
See infra Part V.A. Parents also have a right to choose, among available public schools, where to 
send their children.  However, this right can be limited by the state under reasonable grounds such as 
the availability of places. W. & DM., M. & H.I. v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 96 (1982). 
 16  In Western European countries, where the tendency is for education to be primarily state-
provided and for religious education to form part of the official curriculum, there has been a strong 
tradition of allowing class exemptions. This contrasts with the U.S. where there is no tradition of 
allowing class exemptions in public schools. 
 17  See infra Part V.A. 
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It is debatable whether the mere existence of any of the possible al-
ternatives is sufficient to satisfy parental rights. The case law of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights seems to indicate that international obli-
gations are met as long as parents are provided with an alternative.19 But 
alternatives are not meaningful if they are not really accessible to par-
ents. For example, if private or homeschooling are not viable to parents 
because of their economic situation, then their parental rights may not be 
sufficiently protected unless class exemptions or alternative classes are 
offered in the public education system.20 
If the issue was limited to sectarian religious classes, providing ex-
emptions or alternative classes could be considered the minimum re-
quirement for ensuring such classes do not infringe parental rights. How-
ever, sectarian religious classes are not the only type of classes that 
parents may consider an interference with their right to guide children in 
their own convictions. Mandatory non-sectarian or comparative religious 
classes, secular ethics or religious classes, and sexual education classes 
can all be and often are the cause of conflict between states and parents.21 
Parents may also object not to a whole class, but only to specific content 
within the class or to something that permeates the whole of the school 
curriculum. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that 
the state’s duty to respect parental rights in education does not extend on-
ly to the curriculum, but to the whole of the educational process includ-
ing areas such as extra-curricular activities and discipline.22 As the ten-
dency has shifted toward the secularization of the state—especially in 
Europe—and sectarian religious classes have begun to disappear from 
official curriculums, it has become increasingly common for infringe-
ment claims of parental rights to refer to matters other than religious 
classes.23 
Dealing with the whole range of situations which parents can object 
to based on their internationally recognized educational rights is more 
complicated than simply not making sectarian classes compulsory or al-
lowing parents to exempt their children from such classes. This is one of 
the reasons the European Court of Human Rights has shifted focus from 
class exemptions and other alternatives toward requiring states to comply 
 
 18  See infra Part V.B.  
 19  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 53–54; Jimenez v. Spain, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 1.  
 20  See infra Part V. 
 21  See infra Part IV. 
 22  Campbell v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) ¶¶ 33–36 (1982).   
 23  As will be shown in this article, most of the complaints before the European Court of 
Human Rights concerning parental educational rights relate sexual education classes, secular ethics 
classes or comparative religion classes rather than sectarian religious classes.  
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with the principle of prohibition of indoctrination as a measure of protec-
tion of parental rights.24 
Before closing this section, it is necessary to note that the rights so 
far discussed are rights that are linked with the legal custody of children 
rather than the biological relation between children and parents. For this 
reason, parents have no rights in relation to the education of their chil-
dren if they lose legal custody.25 In the same sense, adoptive parents or 
other legal guardians would have the same rights in relation to the educa-
tion of their children as any biological parents with legal custody. Thus, 
any rights referred throughout this article as parental rights should also 
be understood as custodians’ rights. 
B. The Rights of Children 
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion does not give a right to 
be sheltered from differing views, nor a protection against offensive ide-
as.26 On the contrary, persons have a right to be exposed to different ide-
as and form their own views; states have an obligation to generate an en-
vironment that is conducive to the free exchange of ideas.27 In this sense, 
children’s freedom of thought, conscience, and religion would not give 
them a right to oppose the inclusion of any type of information in school 
curriculum. However, children have the right—independent of those of 
their parents—not to be compelled to participate in any religious activity 
they do not desire.28 Thus, if students in public schools were required to 
participate in activities such as prayers or religious ceremonies, they 
would have a right to request exemptions or alternatives.29 
The freedom of religion and the freedom of expression of children 
 
 24  Part III.A discusses how practical concerns have influenced the adoption of the principle 
of prohibition of indoctrination by the European Human Rights Court.  
 25  For example, when biological parents adopt away their children or a family court has 
granted full legal custody someone else, the biological parents lose their parental educational rights. 
X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. CD 33 (1968); Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1), 
App. No. 10465/83, Eur. Commission H.R. (1986) ¶ 182. The European Court of Human Rights has 
determined that in case of divorces where courts have not fully terminated a parent’s custody, both 
parents can exercise the rights conferred by international human rights law in relation to the educa-
tion of their children. Vojnity v. Hungary, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 37 (2013).  
 26 See Appel-Irrgang v. Germany, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 415, 431. 
 27  See Bustos v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (2001) (Roux-Rengifo, C.V, con-
curring); Paul Sturges, Limits to Freedom of Expression? Considerations Arising from the Danish 
Cartoons Affair, 32 IFLA J. 181, 183 (2006). 
 28  This is because children’s right to freedom of religion under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and other international human rights law instruments is independent from that of 
their parents. 
 29  Provided they are deemed to have attained sufficient maturity to make their own deci-
sions on these matters. See infra Part IV.A. 
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can also be affected by rules regarding school uniforms or prohibiting or 
restricting the display of religious symbols. The requirement to wear uni-
forms in public schools has been accepted as a justifiable restriction on 
the freedom of expression by the European Commission of Human 
Rights.30 However, restricting children from wearing religious symbols at 
school by bans or because they breach of a uniform or dress code is a 
highly controversial practice.31 
As part of the right to privacy (and the general right to health), chil-
dren have a right to sexual and reproductive health. The fulfillment of 
this right requires children to receive adequate information about their 
bodies and sexuality.32 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has expressed that, “States parties should provide adolescents 
with access to sexual and reproductive information, including on family 
planning and contraceptives, the dangers of early pregnancy, the preven-
tion of HIV/AIDS and the prevention and treatment of sexually transmit-
ted diseases”33 and that, “States parties must ensure children have the 
ability to acquire the knowledge and skills to protect themselves and oth-
ers as they begin to express their sexuality.”34 Including this information 
for children to protect their sexual and reproductive health, as part of the 
official school curriculum, is one of the most efficient ways states can 
ensure this information reaches children in fulfillment of their interna-
tional obligations. However, parents sometimes object to these classes if 
they feel they interfere with their ability to raise their children in accord-
ance to their moral convictions. Sexual education is one of the main are-
as where conflicts between the rights of children and parents can arise.35 
The right to education is not exclusive to children, nor is it limited to 
elementary schooling. However, both the San Salvador Protocol and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights estab-
lish that primary education should be free and compulsory to all.36 While 
making primary education free and compulsory to all is the required min-
imum, under the principle of progressive development of economic, so-
cial, or cultural rights, the goal is for secondary education to also become 
 
 30  Stevens v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 245 (1986). 
 31  See infra Part IV.B. 
 32  See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the 
Rights of the Children, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/1 (2003) [hereinafter UNCRC, No. 3]; Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the 
Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶¶ 26, 28, CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003) [hereinafter 
UNCRC, No. 4].  
 33  UNCRC No. 4, supra note 32 ¶ 28. 
 34  UNCRC No. 3, supra note 32 ¶ 16.  
 35  See infra Part IV. 
 36  SSP, supra note 4, at art. 13(3)(a); ICESCR, supra note 2, at art. 13(2)(a). 
10_Powell Edited (Do Not Delete) 7/23/2015  7:48 AM 
604 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2015 
 
free and compulsory if resources allow.37 The provision relating the right 
to education in European Court of Human Rights Protocol 1 does not ob-
ligate states to make education compulsory.38 But the European Court of 
Human Rights has considered that the provision “implies the possibility 
for the State to establish compulsory schooling.”39 
The concept of “compulsory education” means that it is a state obli-
gation to ensure that all children receive at least a minimum level of edu-
cation. Children cannot opt out of their right to receive an education and 
neither can their parents waive this right on their behalf.40 Compulsory 
does not mean, however, that all children can or should be forced to at-
tend state-controlled schools. The ideal is for alternative private educa-
tional institutions to co-exist along the public system.41 However, the ob-
ligation to ensure all children receive an education indicates that states 
must set the minimum standards any alternative must meet and monitor 
whether private institutions are complying with the standards.42 Whether 
parents homeschooling their children should also be authorized, as an al-
ternative to compulsory education, is a controversial issue; it is also de-
bated whether homeschooling can satisfy children’s minimum right to 
education.43 
The vulnerability of children also means that their general human 
rights should sometimes be applied differently than adults.44 The Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child also acknowledges that the capacity of 
children to exercise each of their rights normally evolves as they age.45 
For this reason, the age and maturity of children is relevant when analyz-
ing issues involving their rights, including potential conflicts with the 
goals and interests of their parents, educators, or policy makers.46 
In addition to general human rights, international human rights law 
provides children with special rights. The International Covenant Civil 
 
 37  See Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The 
Right to Education, art. 13, ¶¶ 51–52, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 
UNCESCR, No. 13]. 
 38  Belgian Linguistic Case, supra note 12 ¶ I(B)(3). 
 39  Konrad v. Germany, 2006-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R 355, 365.  
 40  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for Prima-
ry Education, art. 14, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/4 (1999).  
 41  See infra Part V.A. 
 42 UNCESCR No. 13, supra note 37 ¶ 29. 
 43  See infra Part V.B. 
 44  Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 46. This has also been recognized in U.S. case law. See, e.g., 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 45  Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 12(1), Nov 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 [hereinaf-
ter CRC]. 
 46  See infra Part IV.A. 
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and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, along with the American Convention on Human 
Rights and San Salvador Protocol in the Inter-American Human Rights 
Protection System require state parties to provide children with special 
protection due to the inherent vulnerability of inexperience.47 The Con-
vention on the Rights of a Child also establishes special obligations for 
states concerning children. Among other provisions, it requires for the 
children’s view—specifically those children who have the capacity to 
form them—to be taken into account in all matters affecting them48 and 
for the “best interest of the child” to always be the primary considera-
tion.49 The obligation to protect the best interest of the child does not on-
ly apply to actions taken by the state itself, but also to actions taken by 
private actors, including private schools.50 The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child acknowledges the role of parents and requires states to re-
spect parental rights.51 However, sometimes the best interest of the 
child52 requires states to intervene in cases of parental abuse.53 This paper 
deals with cases where parents have not abused or neglected their chil-
dren, but where there are legitimate controversies between parents and 
states regarding the “best interest” of children.54 
C. The Right to Establish Private Educational Institutions 
Both the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights and the San Salvador Protocol recognize the freedom of individu-
al and groups to establish schools independent from those operated by 
the state.55 The right to education provision of European Convention on 
Human Rights’ Protocol 1 does not make express reference to this right 
but the European Commission on Human Rights found that right to be 
implicit.56  The right to establish a private educational institution does not 
refer merely to the freedom of expression—i.e., the right to create centers 
where ideas and information can be freely disseminated. The specific 
 
 47  ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 24(1); ICESCR, supra note 2, at art. 10(3); ACHR, supra 
note 3, at art. 19; SSP, supra note 4, at art. 16. 
 48  CRC, supra note 45, at art. 12(1). 
 49  Id. at art. 3(1). 
 50  Id. at art. 14(1).  
 51  Id. at art. 5. 
 52  Id. at art. 18. 
 53  Id. at art 19(1); see also Human Rights Comm., General Comment 17: Rights of the 
Child, art. 24, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 7, 1989) [hereinafter UNHRC No. 17]. 
 54  See infra Part III. 
 55  ICESCR, supra note 2, at art. 13(4); SSP, supra note 4, at art. 13(5). 
 56  Ingrid Jordebo Found. of Christian Sch. v. Sweden, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
125 (1987). 
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right to establish private schools includes the right to create centers 
where attendees may profit from their studies,57 and receive official 
recognition of their studies as legitimate alternatives to public educa-
tion.58  As noted above, the right of individuals to establish private 
schools is also a right of parents to send their children to alternative 
schools. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights clarifies that the right to establish private schools is subject to 
compliance with “minimum standards” set by the state.59  The European 
Court of Human Rights has also recognized that the right to create pri-
vate schools is not absolute: private schools are subject to regulation.60 
The state has a duty to ensure all private schools meet a standard ade-
quate to satisfy all children’s right to education.61 Among other things, 
private schools may be required to comply with minimum curriculum 
standards. While curriculum standards are necessary for the protection of 
children’s right to education, they can conflict with the rights of institu-
tions if they require teaching in a manner not in accordance with the in-
stitutions’ convictions.62 
D. The Rights of Educators 
In addition to children, parents, and private educational institutions, 
individual teachers and employees of schools—whether public or pri-
vate—also have personal rights. These rights include the freedom of ex-
pression and freedom of religion, and apply even when they perform 
their functions as educator. International human rights law also recogniz-
es the right to academic freedom, which the United Nations Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has described in the following 
terms: 
Members of the academic community, individually or collectively, are 
free to pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through re-
search, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation 
or writing. Academic freedom includes the liberty of individuals to ex-
press freely opinions about the institution or system in which they 
work, to fulfil [sic] their functions without discrimination or fear of re-
pression by the State or any other actor, to participate in professional or 
 
 57  Belgian Linguistic Case, supra note 12 ¶ (I)(B)(4). 
 58  Jordebo, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
 59  ICESCR, supra note 2, at art. 13(4). 
 60  Jordebo, 51 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
 61  UNCESCR, No. 13, supra note 37, ¶ 54. 
 62  See infra Part V. 
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representative academic bodies, and to enjoy all the internationally rec-
ognized human rights applicable to other individuals in the same juris-
diction.63 
Although the right to academic freedom is primarily associated with 
higher education, the UNCESCR has acknowledged that it may also be 
relevant for lower levels of education.64 However, European Court of 
Human Rights has found that the right to education, as prescribed by Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights Protocol 1 does not confer any 
special rights to teachers.65 Teachers’ freedom of expression or religion 
can be restricted for the protection of the rights of children or parents.66 
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROHIBITION OF INDOCTRINATION—
DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
As noted, the initial concept of parental rights in relation to the edu-
cation of their children was that of a right to have them exempted from 
compulsory sectarian religious classes. However, this concept has been 
replaced with the principle that States have an obligation to conduct pub-
lic education in an objective and pluralistic manner that does not indoc-
trinate children into particular worldviews. This prohibition of indoctri-
nation first appeared in European Court of Human Rights case law in 
1976 when the court stated the following in Kjeldsen v. Denmark: 
[T]he State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to educa-
tion and teaching, must take care that information or knowledge includ-
ed in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that 
might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and philosoph-
ical convictions. That is the limit that must not be exceeded.67 
In Kjeldsen, the European Court of Human Rights deemed that sexu-
al education classes that included information on contraception did not 
amount to indoctrination because the information was conveyed objec-
tively.68 However, the court also noted that private schools that were not 
required to teach these classes were available and heavily subsidized by 
 
 63  UNCESCR, No. 13, supra note 37, ¶ 39.  
 64  Id. ¶ 38. 
 65  See Slavic Univ. in Bulg. v. Bulgaria, No. 60781/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). See Part IV of 
the article for a discussion of the implications of the principle of prohibition of indoctrination for 
teachers and other educators. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 53 (1976). 
 68  Id. at 54.  
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the state, and that homeschooling was also permitted.69 These options al-
lowed alternative solutions for parents that wanted to “disassociate” their 
children from the sexual education provided in state schools.70 This deci-
sion left unanswered questions. It was not clear whether the availability 
of alternatives was independently sufficient to satisfy parental rights in 
education, or if the objective presentation at state schools was also re-
quired. Inversely, it was not clear whether an objective and pluralistic 
presentation alone would have sufficed absent alternatives. 
In 2000, the European Court of Human Rights heard another case 
concerning parental opposition to sexual education classes. In Jimenez v. 
Spain, the court maintained the same position adopted in Kjeldsen, hold-
ing that no indoctrination had occurred as the classes were taught objec-
tively and private schools offered adequate alternatives.71 The court also 
addressed parents’ freedoms: 
Parents are thus free to enrol [sic] their children in private schools 
providing an education better suited to their faith or opinions. In the in-
stant case, the applicants have not referred to any obstacle preventing 
the second applicant from attending such a private school. Insofar as 
the parents opted for a state school, the right to respect their beliefs and 
ideas as guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be construed 
as conferring on them the right to demand different treatment in the ed-
ucation of their daughter in accordance with their own convictions.72 
In this pronouncement, the court left the door open to the possibility that 
allowing exemptions or other special arrangements could be necessary, 
even if alternative schools complying with parents’ convictions existed. 
For example, exemptions could be necessary when private school attend-
ance is not feasible for a student due to practical or financial barriers. 
Seven years later, the European Court of Human Rights clarified that 
the presence of private schools, even if state-subsidized, did not exempt 
the state from its obligation to ensure pluralism in public schools.73 In 
that same year, the European Court of Human Rights also expressed the 
following: 
[W]here the Contracting States include the study of religion in the sub-
jects on school curricula, and irrespective of the arrangements for ex-
emption, pupils’ parents may legitimately expect that the subject will be 
taught in such a way as to meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism, 
 
 69  Id.  
 70  Id.   
 71  Jimenez 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 1. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Folgerø v. Norway, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 101 (2007). 
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and with respect for their religious or philosophical convictions.74(em-
phasis added) 
Thus, the obligation to conduct public education in adherence to the 
principles of objectivity and pluralism is independent of the alternatives 
available to parents. The European Court of Human Rights has also de-
termined that parents do not have a right to withdraw children from clas-
ses or request special arrangements if the state satisfies the standards of 
pluralism and objectivity.75 
Based on the above, it appears that the prohibition of indoctrination 
has become the main implication of the provision concerning parental 
rights of the European Convention on Human Righs Protocol 1. It has 
replaced the traditional parental right to obtain exceptions or special ar-
rangements for their children when parents have religious or philosophi-
cal objections to elements of the education provided in the public system. 
At first read, the court’s position regarding prohibition of indoctrina-
tion does not seem to be supported by the actual text of the relevant pro-
vision. Requiring states to “respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philo-
sophical convictions”76 does not seem to require public education to be 
objective or pluralistic. The article could be interpreted as allowing edu-
cation in state schools to be biased toward a particular religious, philo-
sophical, or political view as long as parents consent. Education can also 
be pluralistic and objective while at odds with parents’ convictions. In 
this sense, the plain text of European Convention on Human Rights Pro-
tocol 1 seems to support the classical understanding of the parental right 
to obtain conviction-based class exemptions or alternative arrangements, 
rather than prohibit indoctrination. Judge Verdross maintained this view 
in his separate opinion in Kjeldsen: 
Article 2 . . . constitutes a special rule derogating from the general prin-
ciple in Article 10 . . . of the Convention. Article 2 (P1–2). . . gives par-
ents the right to restrict the freedom to impart to their children not yet 
of age information affecting the development of the latter’s conscienc-
es. 
According to the judgment, it is true, the aforementioned clause of Ar-
ticle 2 . . . prohibits solely education given with the object of indoctri-
nation. However, this clause does not contain any indication justifying 
a restrictive interpretation of such a kind. On the contrary indeed, it re-
quires the States, in an unqualified manner, to respect parents’ religious 
 
 74  Zengin v. Turkey, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 75  Appel-Irrgang, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 415, 429. 
 76  ECHR P1, supra note 5. 
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and philosophical convictions; it makes no distinction at all between 
the different purposes for which the education is provided.77 
However, there are a variety of different bases which have been em-
ployed to justify valuing the prohibition of indoctrination over guarantee-
ing a parental right to obtain class exemptions or special arrangements 
for their children on convictional bases. 
A. Practical Barriers to Guaranteeing Parents’ Rights 
The impracticality of providing children with special treatment each 
time a parent requests, is one of the reasons the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has given for adopting the principle of prohibition of indoc-
trination.78 The range of issues parents may object to extends far beyond 
sectarian religious classes. In this relation, the European Court of Human 
Rights has expressed: 
In particular, the second sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol . . . does 
not prevent States from imparting through teaching or education infor-
mation or knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or philosophi-
cal kind. It does not even permit parents to object to the integration of 
such teaching or education in the school curriculum, for otherwise all 
institutionalised [sic] teaching would run the risk of proving impracti-
cable. In fact, it seems very difficult for many subjects taught at school 
not to have, to a greater or lesser extent, some philosophical complex-
ion or implications. The same is true of religious affinities if one re-
members the existence of religions forming a very broad dogmatic and 
moral entity which has or may have answers to every question of a 
philosophical, cosmological or moral nature.79 (emphasis added) 
U.S. courts have expressed similar concerns: 
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate individu-
ally what the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced 
to cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral 
disagreements with the school’s choice of subject matter. We cannot 
see that the Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational 
systems.80 
Schools cannot be expected to accommodate the personal, moral or re-
ligious concerns of every parent. Such an obligation would not only 
contravene the educational mission of the public schools, but also 
 
 77  Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (1976) (Verdross, A., dissenting). Article 10 
referenced in the quote is the article on freedom of expression.  
 78  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 53. 
 79 Id.  (emphasis added). 
 80  Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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would be impossible to satisfy81 
While providing exemptions or alternative arrangements for sectarian re-
ligious education classes is relatively simple, addressing the whole range 
of objections parents may present is much more complicated. Ensuring 
that public education provided in public schools complies with certain 
standards of objectivism and pluralism is more practical for states to 
comply with and for courts to monitor than deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether specific exemptions or alternatives suffice. However, prac-
tical concerns do not seem independently sufficient to justify negating 
greater deference to parents’ wishes. Even if satisfying parents is some-
times impossible—like when the offending content permeates the curric-
ulum in many classes—that does not justify denying requests that are 
feasible, like when the offending content is isolated to specific classes. 
B. Pluralism in Education is in the Public Interest 
Another argument for prohibition of indoctrination is that states, in-
dependent of parents’ or children’s rights, need to ensure pluralism in 
education because pluralism is in the public interest. The European Court 
of Human Rights has noted that “pluralism in education . . . is essential 
for the preservation of the democratic society.”82 
If the cultural diversity of humankind is revered as an important val-
ue, then it is undesirable for states to pursue the homogeneity of their 
population through indoctrination. Thus, prohibiting indoctrination can 
be justified as a measure to protect diversity. The protection of cultural 
diversity can also be achieved through the allowance  of class exemp-
tions, homeschooling, or private schooling. However, by establishing 
prohibition of indoctrination as an independent principle the protection 
of pluralism is not left to the parents’ agency. Protecting diversity can 
justify prohibiting state indoctrination in education. However, protecting 
diversity cannot justify negating parent’s the right to pull their children 
out of the state curriculum, as this right also contributes to cultural diver-
sity. 
C. The Need to Protect Children’s Rights 
Another argument is that the prohibition of indoctrination is a com-
promise between the rights of children and parents. A requirement for 
public education to be objective and pluralistic can protect children’s 
 
 81  Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1221. 
 82  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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rights to form their own views about religion, politics, morality, or phi-
losophy. The European Court of Human Rights has maintained, “[I]n a 
democratic society, only pluralism in education can enable pupils to de-
velop a critical mind with regard to religious matters in the context of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”83 Judge Power of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights has expressed that pluralism is essential 
to satisfy a child’s right to education: “Education would be diminished if 
children were not exposed to different perspectives on life and, in being 
so exposed, provided with the opportunity to learn the importance of re-
spect for diversity.”84 
Although pluralism and objectivity in education is indeed essential to 
the fulfillment of children’s rights, it cannot be directly inferred from this 
that ensuring such pluralism and objectivity was the objective pursued by 
IHRL provision granting parents rights in relation to the education of 
their children. 
The European Court of Human Rights has considered that, in relation 
to parental rights in education, respect is only “due to convictions on the 
part of the parents which do not conflict with the child’s right to educa-
tion”85 and that parents do not have right to keep their children ignorant 
from religious and philosophical views different from their own.86 The 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has also noted that 
states have an obligation to provide children with the information neces-
sary to protect their sexual and reproductive health—including infor-
mation on contraception and family planning—independent of parental 
consent.87 
In light of these pronouncements, it seems that children’s rights have 
more weight than parental rights. This has been noted by Judge Rozakis 
of the European Court of Human Rights: 
In conclusion, it seems to me that, unlike other guarantees of the Con-
vention, in respect of which the case-law of the Convention has in-
creased the purview of protection, including the right to education, the 
right of parents . . . does not seem realistically to be gaining weight in 
the balancing exercise of the proportionality test.88 
Unlike practical concerns or the public interest in diversity, the need to 
protect children’s rights justifies both requiring states to adhere to plural-
 
 83  Zengin v. Turkey, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 69 (2007).   
 84  Lautsi v. Italy (GC), 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61, 111  (Power, A., concurring). 
 85  Konrad, 2006-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 364. 
 86  Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 89 (2007). 
 87  UNCRC No. 4, supra note 32, ¶ 28. 
 88  Lautsi (GC), 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61, 100 (Rozakis, C., & Vajić, N., concurring).  
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ism and objectivity in public education, and negating parental rights to 
keep children from being exposed to views different from their own. 
Though pluralism in education was not the original goal of international 
human rights law provisions relating to parental rights, it is the maximum 
level of protection that can be afforded to parents while respecting chil-
dren’s own rights—as these rights are currently understood.89 
The above view is supported by the fact that all of the international 
human rights law treaties that confer parents a right to direct the upbring-
ing of their children predate the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
That convention is the result of a paradigm shift regarding the under-
standing of children’s rights within international human rights law. 
Where children were previously seen as mere objects to protect, they are 
now recognized as subjects with rights independent of their parents.90 
State obligations emanating from international human rights law provi-
sions concerning parental rights need to be reinterpreted in light of this 
shift. Professor Jeroen Temperman has accurately noted: “With the entry 
into force of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the paradigm has 
arguably shifted from prior and decisive parental rights to an autonomous 
right children to be free in their choice of religion or belief.”91 Thus, pa-
rental educational rights have primarily become a tool to protect children 
from state indoctrination rather than a tool to compel states to respect 
parents’ wishes.92 Children’s rights are now the primary concern. 
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES INDOCTRINATION 
Prohibition of indoctrination refers to an obligation of the state to 
conduct any activities it undertakes in relation to education in adherence 
to the principles of objectivity and pluralism. Although sectarian reli-
gious classes were the main issue at the time the relevant provisions were 
introduced in international human rights law, indoctrination does not 
necessarily have to be religious in nature. Though the European Court of 
Human Rights has not examined cases concerning political indoctrina-
 
 89  See infra Part V.A. (Parents maintain the right to send their children to private schools, 
but the principle of prohibition of indoctrination extends even to private education). 
 90  Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, supra note 44, ¶ 41 (Cançado 
Trindade, A.A., concurring). 
 91  Jeroen Temperman, State Neutrality in Public School Education: An Analysis of the In-
terplay Between the Neutrality Principle, The Right to Adequate Education, Children’s Right to 
Freedom of Religion or Belief, Parental Liberties, and the Position of Teachers, 32(4) HUM. RTS. Q. 
865, 870 (2010). 
 92  See Laura Lundy, Family Values in the Classroom? Reconciling Parental Wishes and 
Children’s Rights in State Schools, 19(3) INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 346, 357 (2005). 
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tion, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has noted that 
political indoctrination could violate parental rights to direct their child’s 
education.93 
Indoctrination does not only refer to deliberate state action taken 
through the whole of the public education system. For purposes of pro-
tecting a society’s diversity, it may be sufficient to allow individual 
schools and teachers to take their own approach, promoting their particu-
lar views to students. However, as explained, the goal of the prohibition 
of indoctrination is also to protect the right of children to form their own 
consciences and—to the degree children’s rights allow—the right of par-
ents to raise their children in accordance with their convictions. Thus, 
what prohibition of indoctrination requires is not just diversity from 
school to school but pluralism and objectivism within each school. This 
was recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in Kose v. Tur-
key, where the court concluded that the obligation to teach courses on re-
ligions in a pluralistic manner extended to all state schools, even if the 
state had established separate secular and religious schools.94 Similarly, 
the obligation to abstain from indoctrination extends to each individual 
teacher of the public system95 in his or her classroom and limits teachers’ 
freedom of expression and religion.96 In this regard, the European Court 
of Human Rights has expressed the following: 
[A]buses can occur as to the manner in which the provisions in force 
are applied by a given school or teacher and the competent authorities 
have a duty to take the utmost care to see to it that parents’ religious 
and philosophical convictions are not disregarded at this level by care-
lessness, lack of judgment or misplaced proselytism.97 
As already noted, teachers working with children have a right to academ-
ic freedom.98 However, the need to protect children and parents’ rights 
means their academic freedom is much more limited than that of educa-
tors working with adults. 
Determining what constitutes indoctrination in specific cases can be 
a difficult matter. Under international human rights law, states are ex-
pected to promote certain views through their education system such as 
democratic values, respect for human rights, and gender and racial equal-
 
 93  The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, 
doc. 29 rev 1 Conclusions, ¶ 22 (1983). 
 94  Kose v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R 339, 358.  
 95  See Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 462–63; see also 40 Mothers v. 
Sweden, 9 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27, 31 (1977). 
 96  Id. 
 97  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54 (1976). 
 98  See supra Part II1.D. 
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ity.99 While all of these can be considered political or philosophical 
views, directly promoting them in education does not seem to be a pro-
hibited form of indoctrination. This is justified by the fact that opposing 
views are deemed detrimental to the advancement of human rights. 
Views on religion are delicate since what one person may consider 
objective or pluralistic, another may be perceive as indoctrination of sec-
ularism—a philosophical position itself.100 The European Court of Hu-
man Rights has never defined what “objectivity” and “pluralism” mean 
in relation to the principle of prohibition of indoctrination. However, it 
has considered that a violation occurs when the purpose of a class or el-
ement of the curriculum goes beyond the mere transmission of 
knowledge to the direct promotion of a particular view.101 The European 
Court of Human Rights has also given weight to whether students are 
taught about the importance of tolerating and respecting views distinct 
from their own and whether they are encouraged to exercise critical 
thinking as indictors of whether an aim of indoctrination is being pur-
sued.102 
As noted, implementing sectarian religious classes—aimed at indoc-
trinating students into a particular religion in public schools—can be in-
doctrination that is detrimental to parents’ and children’s rights.103 How-
ever, incorporating the study of history of religion, or basic comparative 
religion and ethic classes in the public curriculum is acceptable because 
it enhances children’s freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.104 
International human rights law recognizes a right to change religions, 
which requires that persons have the opportunity to receive information 
about different religions and worldviews in order to form their own.105 
Regarding courses on history of religion or other courses that deal 
with religion in a non-sectarian manner, time limitation prevent explora-
tion of every religious view. Therefore, the European Court of Human 
Rights has deemed it acceptable for states to prioritize teaching students 
about religions that have a presence in their country and to devote more 
time to teaching about religions with historical significance within a 
 
 99  See, e.g., CRC supra note 45, art. 29(1); UNCESCR, No. 13, supra note 37, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 100  Lautsi (GC), 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61,110 (Power, A., concurring). 
 101  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54; see also 40 Mothers, 9 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
27, ,30–31; Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 93 (2007).  
 102  Appel-Irrgang, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 415, 429; see also Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 
51 ¶ 89.  
 103  Kjeldsen v. Denmark, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1973) [hereinafter Kjeldsen 
Comm.]; see also UNHRC, General Comment No. 22: Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion, 
art. 18, ¶ 6 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. (July 30, 1993).  
 104  UNHRC, supra note 103. 
 105  Id. ¶ 5; see also supra note 28 and text accompanying. 
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country or about religions followed by the majority of the population.106 
Thus, Folgero infers that a majority religion, or even an official state re-
ligion, should not be presented as superior to others. In other words, 
quantitative—not qualitative—differences in the treatment of religions 
are acceptable.107 Understanding a religion with a large presence in the 
surrounding society is useful to children and in their best interest, inde-
pendent of whether they or their parents share the religion. 
The other area that is most commonly a cause of controversy be-
tween parents and governments is the issue of whether the mere dissemi-
nation of practical information on matters—such as methods of contra-
ception—can carry the implication of the moral acceptability of their use. 
Judge Verdross has noted this issue: 
[I]t seems to me necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, fac-
tual information on human sexuality that comes within the scope of the 
natural sciences, above all biology, and, on the other hand, information 
concerning sexual practices, including contraception. This distinction is 
required, in my view, by the fact that the former is neutral from the 
standpoint of morality whereas the latter, even if it is communicated to 
minors in an objective fashion, always affects the development of their 
consciences.108 
Since information on practical matters such as the specifics of how to use 
contraception methods is of little worth if it is never intended to be car-
ried into practice, it is reasonable to say that the mere transmission of the 
information also conveys the message that using such methods may be 
morally acceptable.109 In this regard, the majority of the Kjeldsen court 
acknowledged that instructing students on methods of contraception in-
cluded considerations of the moral order in addition to factual 
knowledge.110 However, it concluded that transmitting this information to 
children was acceptable because of the public interest in preventing un-
wanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.111 The majority 
concluded that no indoctrination occurred because no particular sexual 
 
 106  Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 89; Zengin v. Turkey, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (2007).  
 107  See Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95.  
 108  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R.  (Verdross, A., dissenting).  
 109  See Kjeldsen Comm., Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 46, ¶ 10 (1973) (Sperduti, G., 
Ermacora F., Welter F., Busuttil E., Daver, B., Mangan, K., & Custers, J., dissenting) (“Just as the 
pacifist does not want his child to learn how to fight, so the applicants do not want their children to 
learn how to ‘take care of themselves,’ in another context. Both the pacifist and the applicants have 
reason to think that if their children are taught in school to do a particular thing—whether it be to 
carry arms or to have sexual intercourse—they will think that this is morally permissible.”). 
 110  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54. 
 111  Id. 
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conduct was encouraged.112 
The European Court of Human Rights is correct in its conclusion that 
imparting practical information alone on contraception does not amount 
to indoctrination. It is true that providing children with practical infor-
mation on contraception may expose them to the idea that extra-marital 
sex and contraception are morally acceptable, ideas that may opposes 
some parents’ convictions.113 Thus, providing instruction on these mat-
ters without possibility of exemption may have violated parents’ rights as 
originally understood.114  However, merely exposing children to ideas 
opposed by their parents is not sufficient to violate the principle of pro-
hibition of indoctrination, the standard that balances the rights of parents 
and children with public interest.115 Though providing practical infor-
mation on contraception may expose children to the notion that contra-
ception is acceptable, it does not force them to believe that it is wrong to 
think otherwise. In addition to the public interest noted by the European 
Court of Human Rights, providing children with practical information 
about contraception is necessary for the protection of their right to sexual 
and reproductive health.116 Thus, it is clear that the principle of prohibi-
tion of indoctrination does not ban practical instruction on contraception 
methods. 
A. Is Age Relevant for Indoctrination? 
Information that is conveyed pluralistically and objectively can con-
stitute indoctrination if taught to children at too early ages.117  The con-
cern is that any information taught to children before they have devel-
oped a capacity for critical thinking can have a disproportionate effect on 
forming their consciences.118 Thus, states could be required to relegate 
the teaching of matters of religion, morality, or philosophy to the later 
years of the schooling process where children are expected to have at-
tained the required level of maturity to form their own views. 
Students’ ages should be considered when assessing whether educa-
tion amounts to indoctrination. Judge Verdross expressed, “[E]ven objec-
tive information on sexual activity when given too early at school can vi-
 
 112  Id. 
 113  Similar to the convictions of the Christian applicants in Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R.   
 114  That is as a right to keep their children from receiving information contrary to their con-
victions in schools. 
 115  See supra Part III. 
 116  See UNCRC No. 4, supra note 32 ¶ 30. 
 117  See Jennifer Adams Emmerson, “Who is in a family?” Parental Rights and Tolerance-
Promoting Curriculum in Early Elementary Education, 40(4) J.L. & EDUC. 701 (2011).   
 118  See Ciftci v. Turkey, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 339, 344–45. 
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olate the Christian convictions of parents.”119 The majority of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights did not give any consideration to the ages 
of the specific children in question in Kjeldsen. The European Court of 
Human Rights has not yet been required to decide whether there is a spe-
cific age under which states should abstain from teaching children about 
various matters.  However, in Dahlab v. Switzerland the court concluded 
that it was acceptable for the state to ban a teacher from wearing reli-
gious symbols at schools to protect her young students’ right to freedom 
of conscience and religion.120  The court noted that “the applicant’s pu-
pils were aged between four and eight, an age at which children wonder 
about many things and are also more easily influenced than older pu-
pils.”121 In Ciftci v Turkey, the court concluded that states have a right to 
regulate the minimum age in which parents can enroll their children in 
private religious education because of the right of the state to protect 
children from undue influence.122 
In Dahlab and Ciftci, the European Court of Human Rights only es-
tablished that states, if they deem it necessary, can restrict the rights of 
private schools or teachers for the protection of young children, with the 
age of the children being relevant for the proportionality analysis.123 
Whether states also have an obligation not to impart certain information 
in schools to children under a certain age is a separate matter.  However, 
the same concerns regarding children’s rights apply whether it is a pri-
vate actor or the State who is disseminating information to children.  For 
this reason, students’ age is an element that should be taken into consid-
eration when assessing whether a particular action undertaken by a State 
in relation to education amounts to indoctrination. 
Imparting information with religious, philosophical, or moral impli-
cations to children at too early an age—regardless of the source—can 
constitute indoctrination. 
Disagreements are likely to occur between government authorities 
and parents regarding the best age to teach children about any particular 
issue. Appropriate ages will vary from society to society. For this reason, 
states should be allowed some discretion in determining the level of 
schooling in which to place content with potential religious, moral, or 
philosophical implications. But states should be expected to consult with 
relevant experts and carefully consider the level of maturity, which can 
 
 119  Kjeldsen , 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Verdross, A., dissenting). 
 120  Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463.  
 121  Id. 
 122  Ciftci, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 339, 345.  
 123  Id, Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, 463. 
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be expected at each age. Domestic or international courts would have the 
difficult but unavoidable, task of assessing age-based controversies on a 
case-by-case basis. 
B. Is the Prohibition of Indoctrination Limited to Curriculum Content? 
States are not required under international human rights law to re-
main neutral in matters of religion, morality and philosophy; they are 
permitted to have an official religion and even provide a degree of offi-
cial support to it.124 However, in the specific field of education, the rights 
of parents and children may impose upon the states the obligation to 
guarantee the neutrality of the public education system. Since the whole 
education process has an impact on children’s consciences during their 
formative stage, it cannot be said that that this neutrality obligation only 
applies to curriculum content.125 
Thus, the obligation to respect parents’ rights in education “is broad 
in its extent as it applies not only to the content of education and the 
manner of its provision but also to the performance of all the functions 
assumed by the State.”126  Making participation in extracurricular activi-
ties such as ceremonies or functions compulsory can amount to indoctri-
nation if they have religious or philosophical implications.127 Unlike cur-
riculum content, where the right to receive information justifies 
restricting parental rights, there is little justification to make participation 
in activities without informative value compulsory.128 Since the European 
Court of Human Rights has ruled that the obligation to abstain from in-
doctrination through classes on religion is independent from whether the 
possibility for exemption is offered,129 it would seem to follow that States 
are also prohibited from making any extracurricular activities—with po-
tential indoctrinating effects—compulsory, even if they offer objecting 
parents the possibility to get their children exempted.  However, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights’ decisions on this matter seem to indicate 
that requiring students to participate in activities of a religious nature or 
with philosophical implications does not violate the prohibition of indoc-
trination if the possibility of exemption is provided.130 However, it should 
 
 124  See UNHRC, General Comment No. 22, 29 March 2000 ¶¶ 9–10. 
 125  See Lautsi (GC), 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61 (Malinverni, G., dissenting). 
 126  Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted). In the context of the quote, “all the functions” refers to all functions assumed in relation to 
education.  
 127  Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 94 (2007). 
 128  See id. ¶¶ 99–100. 
 129  See supra note 75 and corresponding text 
 130  See Efstratiou v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31; Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. 
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be noted that these decisions pre-date Zengin, where the position that all 
classes should adhere to objectivity and pluralism independent of exemp-
tions was expressed.131 
Issues may also arise in relation to voluntary activities or classes, 
which are organized or supported by the government or individual 
schools. The European Court of Human Rights has determined that it is 
not indoctrination if a state offers religious classes, even if of a fully sec-
tarian nature, as long as they are completely voluntary.132 For a course or 
activity to be considered completely voluntary, there cannot be any det-
rimental consequences to a student’s non-participation.133 The European 
Court of Human Rights, in its decisions relating to voluntary religious 
classes, did not discuss age implications.  However, classes or activities 
with important religious, philosophical, or moral implications should not 
be offered in public schools to children under a certain age, even if they 
are voluntary.134 
One issue that is frequently a cause for controversy is the distribution 
of contraceptives in schools. U.S. courts have held that like informative 
classes, the distribution of condoms or other contraceptives in schools 
exposes children to the idea that using them may be morally acceptable, 
but it does not indoctrinate them into believing so.135 The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has recognized that children have a 
right to “free or low cost contraception, condoms and services.”136 For 
this reason, the need to guarantee children’s rights means parents do not 
have a right to prevent schools from implementing such distribution pro-
grams or to make distribution to their children dependent upon their con-
sent.137  Similarly, if health services are offered in schools, children have 
a right to access them with confidentiality.138 Parents sometimes oppose 
on religious or philosophical bases their children having access to certain 
services, such as those relating to sexual and mental health. However, the 
mere availability of these services in schools should not be considered 
 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 30; Folgerø, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 ¶ 98. 
 131  If only by months, as in Folgerø. See supra note 75 and corresponding text 
 132  Saniewski v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); see also C.J., J.J. and E.J. v. Poland, Eur. 
Comm’n of H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1996). 
 133  See Grzelak v. Poland, 7710/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).  
 134  See supra Part IV. 
 135  This conclusion has also been reached in U.S. Case Law. See Parents United for Better 
Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Pa. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 136  UNCRC, No. 3, supra note 32 ¶ 17. 
 137  Parents United involved a condom distribution program that did not require prior paren-
tal consent, but was constitutional because it allowed opting out. 148 F.3d 260, 270, 277 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 138  UNCRC, No. 4, supra note 32 ¶ 33. 
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indoctrination. 
The European Commission on Human Rights concluded in 1986 that 
imposing a uniform requirement on all students did not violate the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, even if parents objected on philo-
sophical bases.139 The requirement to wear a uniform cannot be consid-
ered a per se form of indoctrination; however, uniforms could be used to 
pursue indoctrination goals by including symbols with religious, philo-
sophical, or political connotations in the clothing.  The European Court 
of Human Rights has not yet been required to decide on this issue. If 
prohibition of indoctrination extends to all elements of the public educa-
tion system, then it follows that states should be prohibited from includ-
ing symbols that manifest an allegiance to a particular religion or politi-
cal ideology in school uniforms. 
Another issue of controversy occurs when religious symbols are 
banned or deemed incompatible with school uniforms or dress codes. As 
noted, the European Court of Human Rights has deemed it compatible 
with international human rights law to prohibit teachers from wearing re-
ligious symbols in schools.140 Teachers are in a position of power in rela-
tion to their students. For this reason, the wearing of religious symbols 
by them can unduly influence students (especially students of younger 
ages) and therefore can be considered a form of abusive proselytism.141 
Since public school teachers are state agents, the principle of prohibition 
of indoctrination justifies limiting their rights for the protection of chil-
dren’s and parents’ rights. 
Banning the display of symbols by students is different as students 
are not in a situation of hierarchical superiority in relation to each other. 
The European Court of Human Rights has not yet decided on the com-
patibility of prohibiting children from displaying religious symbols at 
schools with international human rights law.  However, in the context of 
higher education, it has considered those bans to be acceptable re-
strictions on the freedom of religion when necessary for the protection of 
the rights of others. In this regard, European Court of Human Rights has 
expressed: 
[M]easures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist reli-
gious movements from exerting pressure on students who did not prac-
tise [sic] their religion or who belonged to another religion were not 
considered to constitute interference for the purposes of Article 9 of the 
Convention. Consequently, it is established that institutions of higher 
 
 139  Stevens v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 245 (1986). 
 140  Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447, 463. 
 141  Id.  
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education may regulate the manifestation of the rites and symbols of a 
religion by imposing restrictions as to the place and manner of such 
manifestation with the aim of ensuring peaceful co-existence between 
students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and the be-
liefs of others.142 
If a religious denomination is dominant at a particular school, the display 
of symbols relating to that religion by a majority of the students can be 
used as a form of peer pressure proselytism. Children can be affected 
more than adults by these types of displays. If protecting adult students 
from peer pressure is considered a valid justification for restricting other 
students’ religious rights in higher education institutions, a restriction on 
wearing religious symbols would seem even more acceptable if imple-
mented in elementary or secondary schools.143 Protecting the right of 
freedom from undue pressure for children or attempts to make them feel 
alienated can justify a policy prohibiting the display of religious symbols 
in schools. 
The rights of parents should be considered when the issue concerns 
their children. The display of religious symbols necessitates balancing 
the rights of parents who may feel that requiring their children to aban-
don their religious symbols when going to school indoctrinates their 
children into secularism; with the rights of other parents that may include 
those who feel their rights are affected if their children are exposed to 
such symbols. 
Evidently, a case of a concerted effort to exercise proselytism by 
peer pressure or to alienate or make feel uncomfortable students with re-
ligious views distinct from the surrounding majority through religious 
symbols is very extreme case. Thus, banning religious symbols could be 
justified in certain contexts but it will not always be required. If there is 
no risk that displaying of religious symbols by students would interfere 
with other children’s rights, then it is not necessary to forbid such dis-
plays.144 States should have a margin of discretion in whether to author-
ize or prohibit wearing religious symbols in schools. 
However, when a restriction is deemed necessary, it can be justified 
to restrict all symbols, even those that have not raised cause for concern. 
A neutral rule, even if more restrictive, is preferred over banning specific 
symbols. Banning some symbols but not others can exacerbate conflicts 
between students of different religious orientations and disrupt the mis-
 
 142  Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 ¶ 111. 
 143  See supra Part IV.A. 
 144  See Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (2008).  
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sion of the school system.145 
In addition to the wearing of religious symbols by students or staff, 
the placement of religious symbols in public schools by state authorities 
has also been the subject of controversy.  In Lautsi v. Italy, the second 
section of the European Court of Human Rights held that placing reli-
gious symbols in public schools violated the prohibition of indoctrina-
tion, noting the following: 
The schooling of children is a particularly sensitive area in which the 
compelling power of the State is imposed on minds which still lack 
(depending on the child’s level of maturity) the critical capacity which 
would enable them to keep their distance from the message derived 
from a preference manifested by the State in religious matters.146 
They further noted: 
[I]n countries where the great majority of the population owe allegiance 
to one particular religion the manifestation of the observances and 
symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, 
may constitute pressure on students who do not practise [sic] that reli-
gion or those who adhere to another religion.147 
However, that decision was later reversed by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights Grand Chamber, which concluded that the mere presence of 
religious symbols in schools does not amount to indoctrination.148 The 
Grand Chamber based its decision on the lack of actual evidence regard-
ing the impact of the symbol’s presence on students’ minds: 
There is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious 
symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it 
cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on 
young persons whose convictions are still in the process of being 
formed.149 
The Grand Chamber also considered that the passive display of religious 
symbols in schools had to be distinguished from classes or extracurricu-
lar activities, which are of an active nature: 
[A] crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point is 
of importance in the Court’s view, particularly having regard to the 
principle of neutrality. It cannot be deemed to have an influence on pu-
pils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious 
 
 145  It can also be considered discriminatory to ban some symbols while allowing others.  
 146  Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 48 (2009).  
 147  Id. ¶ 50.  
 148  Lautsi (GC), 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61. 
 149  Id. ¶ 66. 
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activities.150 
The Grand Chamber was correct in noting that no actual evidence had 
been presented regarding the impact displaying crucifixes in schools 
could have upon children’s minds. However, this does not seem suffi-
cient to ascertain that the prohibition of indoctrination had not been vio-
lated.  Every experience children are exposed to contributes to forming 
their consciences, and it is difficult to assess exactly how much of an im-
pact the passive display of religious symbols can have upon children. 
The precise impact is likely to vary from child to child, with some chil-
dren not being influenced at all.  However, the possibility cannot be de-
nied that the display of symbols can have some influence over at least 
some children, especially the younger ones.  In Dahlab, the mere theoret-
ical possibility that a teacher wearing religious symbols could influence 
her students was deemed sufficient to justify restricting her rights.151 Fol-
lowing this view, if a theoretical risk to children’s rights is considered 
sufficient to restrict a person’s freedom of religion, it should also be suf-
ficient to require a state to abstain from a determinate conduct.152 
While the display of symbols is passive in nature, constant and ubiq-
uitous displays, like those in Lautsi, do not necessarily pose a lesser risk 
of indoctrination than individual classes or events, even if the later are 
active in nature.153  Thus, the original decision of the Second Section was 
correct in that a constant presence of religious symbols throughout public 
schools violates the prohibition of indoctrination. 
V. WHAT THE PROHIBITION OF INDOCTRINATION MEANS FOR PRIVATE 
EDUCATION AND HOMESCHOOLING 
The need to balance parents’ rights against children’s rights and pub-
lic interest has meant less deference to parents’ wishes. The prohibition 
of indoctrination has minimized the traditional right of parents to require 
public schools to provide exemptions or special arrangements for their 
children due to philosophical or religious objections. However, the right 
of parents to opt to send their children to private schools instead of pub-
lic ones remains protected by international human rights law. However, it 
is highly debated whether parents also have a right to opt to homeschool 
 
 150  Id. ¶ 72. 
 151  Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447. 
 152  Lautsi (GC) 2011-III Eur. Ct. H. R. 61, 116 (Malinverni, G., & Kalaydjieva, Z., dissent-
ing). 
 153  See id. ¶ 55.  
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their children.154 This Part discusses what the principle of prohibition of 
indoctrination means for private education and home schooling. 
A. What the Prohibition of Indoctrination Means for Private Education 
The right to establish private schools remains an essential part of 
freedom of education under international human rights law. This right is 
meant as more than a simple commercial liberty to operate centers of in-
struction as a business enterprise.155 The right to establish private schools 
is the right to offer an alternative to compulsory state education and, by 
extension, the right of parents to have alternative schools to send their 
children to.156 The right to establish private schools ensures that educa-
tion is not a state monopoly. The availability of private schools as an al-
ternative to the public education system offers an additional protection 
against the threat of state indoctrination, which, as all human rights vio-
lations, can occur even if prohibited by international law. 
As private entities and not state agents, it is not clear whether private 
schools are bound by the principle of prohibition of indoctrination. How-
ever, it is clear that states have a duty to regulate any schools they au-
thorize as alternatives to public education to ensure the education provid-
ed is sufficient to satisfy the students’ right to education.157 The European 
Court of Human Rights has expressed that the prohibition of indoctrina-
tion applies to all functions the state assumes in relation to education, in-
cluding the regulation of private schools.158 This means states cannot use 
any conditions or restrictions they impose upon private schools to pursue 
an aim of indoctrination. It can also be interpreted to mean that states are 
required to ensure that the private schools under their supervision abstain 
from indoctrination.159 
It is clear that states can and must establish an essential curriculum to 
be followed by private schools in order to protect children’s rights. It is 
 
 154  For reference regarding the homeschooling debate in the U.S. context see for example, 
Chad Olsen, Constitutionality of Home-Education: How the Supreme Court and American History 
Endorse Parental Choice, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 399 (2009); Gage Raley, Yoder revisited: why 
the landmark Amish schooling case could—and should—be overturned, 97(3) VA. L. REV. 681 
(2011). 
 155  See supra Part II.C. 
 156  See supra Part II.A. 
 157  See supra Part II.C. 
 158  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (1976).  
 159  This interpretation holds more weight in the cases where states do not only regulate pri-
vate schools, but directly support them with direct funding or other type of subsidies. Under interna-
tional human rights law, states can incur international liability by the actions of particulars, which 
have acted with their support. See Blake v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36 (1998) ¶ 
76. 
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not so clear whether private schools can be required to teach content that 
is contrary to the religious, philosophical, or moral beliefs of their own-
ers or founders. The European Court of Human Rights case law seems to 
support providing freedom to private schools in relation to the teaching 
of controversial content. In Kjeldsen and Jimenez, the court considered 
the fact that private schools were not required to teach the sexual educa-
tion classes opposed by parents as a positive element which evidenced 
that parents’ rights were being respected.160 However, in other areas, 
such as school discipline, the European Court of Human Rights has con-
sidered that states can be subjected to international liability if children’s 
rights are violated by the actions of a private school.161 Four justices 
elaborated this point in their partly dissenting opinion in Costello-
Roberts v. United Kingdom: 
The State must exercise some measure of control over private schools 
so as to safeguard the essence of the Convention guarantees. A State 
can neither shift prison administration to the private sector and thereby 
make corporal punishment in prisons lawful, nor can it permit the set-
ting up of a system of private schools which are run irrespective of 
Convention guarantees.162 
 From the perspective of guaranteeing parents’ rights and ensuring 
diversity and pluralism in society, it can be preferable for private schools 
to teach in accordance with their own convictions. However, if children’s 
rights to receive information necessary to protect their well-being and to 
form their own views are recognized, then states would have an obliga-
tion to ensure that private schools respect those rights and play a role in 
their fulfillment. 
If states require private schools to teach the exact same content 
taught by public schools, then their value as an alternative to the public 
system is seriously diminished.  However, issues of inequity can also oc-
cur if private schools are allowed complete freedom in relation to the 
teaching of content with religious, moral, or philosophical implications.  
If a state deems certain information so essential for children that it must 
be taught to them in public schools, even against parents’ wishes, but al-
lows private schools to omit this information from their curriculum, then 
that state has failed to protect the rights of private schools’ students to 
receive essential information.163If certain curriculum content is deemed 
 
 160  Kjeldsen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54; Jimenez v. Spain, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 1. 
 161  Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247-C ECHR Ser-A, 27  ¶¶ 27–28 (1993). 
 162  Id. (Ryssdal, R., Thór Vilhjálmsson, Matscher, F., & Wildhaber, L., dissenting). 
 163  See supra Part III.C. Information that is necessary for children to protect their sexual and 
reproductive health or to form their own views on religious matters can be considered essential. 
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non-essential for the fulfillment of children´s rights, then private schools 
may be authorized to omit this content. However, if public schools do not 
allow parents to exempt their children from such non-essential content, a 
right to keep that information from their children would exist only for 
parents who can afford to send their children to private schools. 164 Ineq-
uities of treatment of this sort can amount to discrimination. For this rea-
son, if certain content is deemed essential for children’s rights then states 
can and should require private schools to teach it, even if parents object 
under religious or philosophical bases. 
The above does not mean that private schools cannot have allegiance 
or affinity with any particular religious or philosophical worldview. Re-
ligious schools have a long tradition in many countries, and they have 
been proven to be able to provide high standard education.  Private 
schools can provide sectarian religious classes to children over a certain 
age, as these children could also be educated in religion outside of formal 
schools.165 They can also add additional information, or a more detailed 
explanation of the school’s view on a particular issue, to the content in-
cluded in the official curriculum.166 Thus, the difference between public 
and private schools should not be that private schools are allowed to omit 
elements of the official curriculum, but that they can make additions to 
that curriculum. 
B. What the Prohibition of Indoctrination Means for Homeschooling 
Under the traditional understanding of parental rights, allowing par-
ents to homeschool their children was a legitimate alternative. Home-
schooling could protect the rights of those parents who objected to the 
public education curriculum for religious or philosophical reasons. This 
alternative was especially valuable for parents who could not afford to 
send their children to private schools or who could not find a private 
school, which suited their wishes for their children’s education.  Author-
izing homeschooling can also serve as an additional protection against 
the threat of state indoctrination and advance the public interest of hav-
ing a diverse society. 
However, concern has been expressed that authorizing homeschool-
ing can interfere with children’s right to education.167 Not all parents may 
 
 164  See Kjeldsen Comm., Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. ¶¶ 5, 8, 12 (Sperduti, G., Ermacora 
F., Welter F., Busuttil E., Daver, B., Mangan, K., & Custers, J., dissenting). 
 165  See supra, note 109 and corresponding text. 
 166  Provided they do not promote intolerance toward opposing or different views, which 
would be contrary to the internationally accepted goals of education. 
 167  See Courtenay E. Moran, How to Regulate Homeschooling: Why History Supports the 
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be sufficiently versed in all the required subjects in order to satisfy their 
children’s right to a minimum level of education.168 In comparison to pri-
vate schools, monitoring whether the education provided by parents is 
sufficient may be a more complicated and burdensome task for states. 
Homeschooling may also deprive children of other benefits associat-
ed with school education such as the daily social interaction with other 
students that can be valuable for their development.169 The United Na-
tions Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted that the basic skills 
children have a right to receive go far beyond reading and math: 
Basic skills include not only literacy and numeracy but also life skills 
such as the ability to make well-balanced decisions; to resolve conflicts 
in a non-violent manner; and to develop a healthy lifestyle, good social 
relationships and responsibility, critical thinking, creative talents, and 
other abilities which give children the tools needed to pursue their op-
tions in life.170 
The European Court of Human Rights expressed that states are allowed 
to deny parents the opportunity to homeschool their children if necessary 
to protect their children’s rights.171 The court notes that young children 
are “unable to foresee the consequences of their parents’ decision to opt 
for home education.”172 However, the court has not decided whether a 
state fails its obligation to protect children’s rights when it authorizes 
homeschooling. One issue is that the elements of the official curriculum 
that parents object to and seek to keep their children from through home-
schooling may be information that is deemed essential for the fulfillment 
of children’s rights. If receiving certain information is deemed essential 
to satisfy children’s’ rights, then allowing parents to keep children from 
this information through homeschooling would mean that the state is fail-
ing to protect the rights of those children. If the goal of banning indoctri-
nation is protecting children’s right to form their own consciences, then 
states have an obligation to ensure children have access to views differ-
ent from those of their parents.  Thus, states should not authorize home-
schooling for the sole reason that parents object to information their chil-
dren have the right to receive.173 
 
Theory of Parental Choice, 2011(3) U. ILL. LAW REV. 1061 (2011).  
 168  See id.  
 169  See Konrad, 2006-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 360–61.  
 170  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, art. 
29(1), ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001). 
 171  Konrad, 2006-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 364–66.  
 172  Id. at 365. 
 173  This does not mean that the practice of homeschooling is not acceptable. There are cases 
when it can be in the best interest of a child to be homeschooled. For example, health issues can 
10_Powell Edited (Do Not Delete) 7/23/2015  7:48 AM 
2] PROHIBITION OF INDOCTRINATION 629 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Providing the deference to parental wishes implied by the text of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 1 and other human 
rights treaties with similar wording has become incompatible with chil-
dren’s rights as they are now understood. The principle of prohibition of 
indoctrination adopted by the European Court of Human Rights is an ad-
equate guide for balancing parental and children’s rights in education. 
The line between instruction and indoctrination is not always a clear one; 
however, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights provides 
some guidance. The prohibition of indoctrination not only applies to 
statewide policies, but also to the actions of each individual school and 
teacher. Controversial content, such as instruction on contraceptive 
methods or on different worldviews, does not constitute indoctrination if 
it does not aim to promote a specific view to children. Children’s ages 
should be considered a relevant factor when assessing the risk of indoc-
trination. States are not exempted from their obligation to protect chil-
dren’s rights in education when parents opt to send their children to pri-
vate schools or to homeschool them. The prohibition of indoctrination 
needs to be taken into account in the regulation of private schools and 
when deciding whether to authorize homeschooling. 
Fernando Méndez Powell 
 
 
make regular school attendance difficult.   
